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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

SCHUETTE V. COALITION TO DEFEND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION:
THE MAJORITY’S TYRANNY TOWARD UNEQUAL EDUCATIONAL
OPPORTUNITY

LAURA MCNEAL*
INTRODUCTION
Under our Constitution, majority rule is not without limit. Our system of
government is predicated on an equilibrium between the notion that a majority
of citizens may determine governmental policy through legislation . . .
nonetheless some things the Constitution forbids even a majority of citizens to
1
do.

For years, stakeholders in education have worked tirelessly to ensure that
every child, regardless of his or her race, class, gender, or racial and ethnic
identity, has access to equal educational opportunity. Despite these efforts, the
opportunity gap in K-12 schools continues to grow and racial disparities in
education remain a prominent fixture in the education milieu. Many legal
scholars characterize the failed education reform efforts in the aftermath of
Brown v. Board of Education as a slow retreat from substantive equality. This
is primarily due to the Court’s transition from judicial activism for
disadvantaged minorities through race-conscious measures to post-racial
determinism—the notion that any use of race is presumptively unconstitutional
since all state-sponsored discrimination has been eradicated.2 This doctrinal
shift toward post-racial determinism is further evidenced by a series of rulings
in the post-Brown era that undermined efforts to create diverse and equitable

* Professor Laura McNeal is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Louisville
Brandeis School of Law. Special thanks to Professor Cedric Merlin Powell, University of
Louisville, and Professor Tanya Washington, Georgia State University, for their thoughtful
comments and invaluable insight. My thanks to the St. Louis University Law Journal Editorial
Board, especially Jay Ji, Symposium Managing Editor, for his flexibility and patience in working
to bring this Article to publication.
1. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight
for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1667 (2014) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
2. Cedric Merlin Powell, Justice Thomas, Brown, and Post-Racial Determinism, 53
WASHBURN L.J. 451, 452–53 (2014).
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schools under the guise of neutrality.3 The judicial endorsement of color-blind
rhetoric, despite the glaring racial disparities in education achievement
outcomes, has been an effective tool in limiting the use of race-conscious
measures in education. Although opponents of the use of race-conscious
policies to integrate public schools have relied heavily on the judicial system to
further their interests, there is a burgeoning movement to further those goals
through the political process.
For decades, the Supreme Court has played an integral role in shaping the
structure of our democratic process. At the heart of our democratic system is
the principle of equal participation through the concept one man, one vote.4 In
the context of education, the political process can be used as a path toward
educational equity through the enactment of laws designed to ensure that every
child has equal educational opportunity regardless of his or her race, ethnicity,
class, gender, or sexual orientation. But what happens when the political
process is used to hinder as opposed to promote educational equity? Or when
the majority capitalizes on knowledge that minorities are politically a
paradigmatically powerless group by asserting its advantage to enact state laws
that undermine minority interests?5 The very essence of democracy is premised
on the belief that every individual should have an equal voice in the political
process. However, how do you preserve the founding principles of democracy,
which is a system that recognizes each individual’s right to civic participation,
while preventing those rights from being altered or discarded by a tyranny of
the majority?6 The recent Supreme Court ruling in Schuette v. Coalition to

3. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 735
(2007) (“The districts have also failed to show that they considered methods other than explicit
racial classifications to achieve their stated goals. Narrow tailoring requires ‘serious, good faith
consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives.’”); Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 284 (W.D. Tex. 1971) (arguing that public education should not be a
system based upon wealth, but instead should be a system of “fiscal neutrality”), rev’d, 411 U.S.
1 (1973). See also Cedric Merlin Powell, Harvesting New Conceptions of Equality: Opportunity,
Results, and Neutrality, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 255, 279 (2012) (“[Milliken v. Bradley] is a
seminal decision because it literally changes the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment in the
school cases and beyond. It lays the doctrinal groundwork for the post-racial Parents Involved
decision, and it sets the stage for the post-racial merging of Fourteenth Amendment and Title VII
principles in Ricci. The doctrinal thread that runs through all of the decisions is the protection of
white interests and privilege. The Court literally ignores evidence of systemic racial
discrimination in order to preserve suburban school districts and insulate them from the burden of
urban integration.”).
4. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 557–61 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1,
7–8 (1964).
5. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 84
(1980).
6. See Thomas L. Murphy, The Dangers of Overreacting to “Judicial Activism,” UTAH
B.J., Jan.–Feb. 2006, at 38, 41.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2015]

SCHUETTE V. COALITION TO DEFEND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

387

Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for
Equality by Any Means Necessary (BAMN) addresses this very quandary
through the lens of the political process doctrine.
Manipulating the political process for the purpose of oppressing minority
groups violates the spirit and purpose of the Equal Protection Clause. A core
strand of the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence is to ensure that
all citizens have the right to meaningfully participate in the democratic
process.7 Restructuring the political process to unfairly burden minorities for
the purpose of hindering their ability to represent their interests is an act of
moral exclusion. According to Moral Exclusion Theory, moral exclusion may
be defined as “a psychosocial orientation toward certain individuals or groups
for whom justice principles or considerations of fairness and allocation of
resources are not applicable.”8 Moral exclusion serves as a breeding ground for
discrimination, prejudice, and practices that benefit the majority at the expense
of the minority. Under Moral Exclusion Theory, the dominant group creates
moral boundaries in which those considered outside the boundaries (i.e. the
minority group) are expendable and any harm inflicted upon them is
considered just.9 Examining the intersection of moral exclusion and the
political process doctrine is an important step toward understanding barriers to
educational equity in K-12 schools.
The Schuette decision has alarming implications for equal education
opportunity because it constitutionalized statewide reverse discrimination suits
and thus will have the effect of overturning what is left of race-conscious
measures designed to create diverse and equitable learning environments. This
Article will highlight how the Court’s decision in Schuette morally excludes
minority children from equal educational opportunity. Part I will provide a
brief doctrinal history of the road to Schuette through a discussion of the
emergence of the political process doctrine and equal protection jurisprudence
in the pre-Schuette era. Part II examines the Court’s decision in Schuette to
highlight how the Court misapplied the political process doctrine to advance
the rhetoric of neutrality. Part III of the article highlights how the Schuette
Court’s interpretation of the political process doctrine promotes the moral
exclusion of minority children from equal educational opportunity. Part IV will
conclude with a discussion of how to transition from moral exclusion to moral

7. See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights &
Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1651 (2014) (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting).
8. Laura Leets, Interrupting the Cycle of Moral Exclusion: A Communication Contribution
to Social Justice Research, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1859, 1860 (2001).
9. Susan Opotow, Moral Exclusion and Injustice: An Introduction, J. SOC. ISSUES, Spring
1990, at 1, 1.
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inclusion of minority children in K-12 education milieus in the post-Schuette
Era.
I. THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE AND POLITICAL PROCESS DOCTRINE:
THE ROAD TO SCHUETTE
Racial preferences in the context of governmental decision-making have
been a long and heated debate in the public sphere, especially in the context of
education. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is often
at the center of legal disputes regarding the constitutionality of race-conscious
policies. Although the Supreme Court promoted diverse and equitable learning
environments through a series of landmark education law cases,10 there are
strong indices that affirmative action policies are in their final days. In recent
years, equal protection jurisprudence has shifted from race-conscious to raceneutral approaches to educational equity.11 Advocates of color-blind
approaches to equal opportunity have developed a unique strategy to
prohibiting the use of racial preferences in government decision-making under
the guise of neutrality through the state political process. Specifically, several
states have passed referendums that invalidate the use of racial preferences in
governmental decisions.12 As a result, the political process doctrine emerged as
a framework for evaluating the constitutionality of these controversial ballot
initiatives.
The central purpose of the political process doctrine is to safeguard
minorities’ rights to equal participation in the political process.13 Under the
political process doctrine, a governmental action violates the Fourteenth
Amendment rights of minority groups when the following two criteria are met:

10. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (holding that (1) the law school had a
compelling interest in attaining a diverse student body, and (2) the admissions program was
narrowly tailored to serve its compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow
from a diverse student body and thus did not violate the Equal Protection Clause); Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311–12 (1978) (“The fourth goal asserted by [the
university] is the attainment of a diverse student body. This clearly is a constitutionally
permissible goal for an institution of higher education.”); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
493–95 (1954) (“In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms. . . . We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’
has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”).
11. Powell, supra note 2.
12. Peter M. Bean, Have We Reached Grutter’s “Logical End Point?” The Fight Over State
Law Bans on Preferential Treatment Programs and the Future of Affirmative Action in the United
States, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 485, 490 (2014).
13. Lisa White Shirley, Comment, Reassessing the Right of Equal Access to the Political
Process: The Hunter Doctrine, Affirmative Action, and Proposition 209, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1415,
1416–17 (1999).
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(1) the governmental action has a racial focus and targets a program that
primarily benefits minorities, and (2) the governmental action restructures the
political process in a way that places a unique burden on racial minorities’
ability to advocate for their own interests. This section will briefly highlight
the three seminal cases that collectively provide the doctrinal framework for
the political process doctrine.
A.

Political Process Doctrine Trilogy: Hunter, Seattle, and Crawford
1.

Hunter v. Erickson: Burdens Minority Interests

The central issue in Hunter14 was whether an amendment to a city charter
to prevent a city council from implementing a fair housing ordinance without
the approval of the majority of Akron voters violated the Equal Protection
Clause.15 In this case, the plaintiff, an African American woman, alleged she
was denied equal opportunity to live in certain residences because the owners
specified to her real estate agent their refusal to sell to minorities.16 As a result,
she was not permitted to view certain properties because of her race.17 Prior to
the plaintiff’s incident, the Akron City Council enacted a fair housing
ordinance to address this type of housing discrimination to ensure that all
individuals, regardless of race, color, religion, national origin, or ancestry,
have equal opportunity to the same available housing facilities.18 The central
goal of the city’s fair housing ordinance was to deter discriminatory housing
practices that promoted substandard, unsafe, segregated housing for
minorities.19 Following the passage of the city’s anti-discrimination housing
ordinance, voters in opposition of the anti-discrimination ordinance amended
the city charter through a ballot initiative requiring a majority vote at a general
election to approve any law which regulates any aspect of the real estate
market based on considerations of race.20 Thus, this ballot initiative only
permitted the passage of race-conscious anti-discrimination housing laws
14. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
15. Id. at 386.
16. Id. at 387.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 386. The year the Akron City Council enacted the Fair Housing Act was 1964,
which coincided with the historic passing of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. During this era in U.S.
history, a significant number of legal milestones were passed to support the spirit and purpose of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: equality regardless of an individual’s
race, class, gender, religion, or national origin.
19. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391 (“The preamble to the open housing ordinance which was
suspended by § 137 recited that the population of Akron consists of ‘people of different race,
color, religion, ancestry or national origin, many of whom live in circumscribed and segregated
areas, under substandard unhealthful, unsafe, unsanitary and overcrowded conditions, because of
discrimination in the sale, lease, rental and financing of housing.’”).
20. Id. at 387.
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through the political process, removing the power from local city officials to
do so. As a result, the city of Akron was unable to process the plaintiff’s
housing discrimination complaint due to the recently passed antidiscrimination housing ordinance that invalidated the fair housing ordinance
absent a change in the charter amendment. As a result, the amendment left
minority citizens, such as the plaintiff, with no protections from discriminatory
housing practices. The plaintiff filed suit contending that the charter
amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.21
The Hunter Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, holding that the charter
amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause.22 The Court reasoned that the
charter amendment’s exclusive focus on antidiscrimination ordinances “places
special burdens on racial minorities within the governmental process” and is
therefore not permitted.23 Government action may not be taken with the
malicious intent to harm a racial minority.24 The Hunter case established the
bedrock principle that a state may not restructure the procedures of the
government for the purpose of targeting racial minorities, even if the manner is
facially neutral.25 Since the charter amendment invalidated a law designed to
protect racial minorities and altered the political process in a manner that
resulted in invidious discrimination that burdened minority interests, the Court
applied the most stringent scrutiny.26 In applying strict scrutiny, the Court
found that the charter amendment was unconstitutional because Akron failed to
provide a compelling governmental interest for the amendment.27 The Court
rejected Akron’s principal argument in support of the charter amendment,
which was based on the uncontested fact that fair housing legislation is likely
to invoke a great deal of passion within the community.28 It was not necessary,

21. Id. at 387–88.
22. Id. at 393.
23. Id. at 391.
24. See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 392–93.
25. Id. at 391 (“Like the law requiring specification of candidates’ race on the ballot,
Anderson v. Martin, [375 U.S. 399 (1964)], § 137 places special burdens on racial minorities
within the governmental process. This is no more permissible than denying them the vote, on an
equal basis with others.”).
26. Id. at 391–92 (“Because the core of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of
meaningful and unjustified official distinctions based on race, racial classifications are
‘constitutionally suspect,’ and subject to the ‘most rigid scrutiny.’” (citations omitted)).
27. Id. at 392. Akron attempted to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest to justify
the discrimination that resulted from restructuring the political process by “[c]haracterizing it
simply as a public decision to move slowly in the delicate area of race relations.” Id. The Court
rejected Akron’s argument, stating that the amendment was not needed to slow the pace of the
public discourse and action in the area of race relations or to provide Akron citizens the
opportunity to participate in the decision-making process. Id.
28. Id. at 395 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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however, to pass this amendment in order to assure that particularly sensitive
issues would ultimately be decided by the general electorate.29 Akron had
already established a procedure, which was based upon a neutral principle that
mandated a general referendum on the issue with the support of at least ten
percent of the voters.30
The Hunter case is significant because the Court establishes one of the
three core elements of the political process doctrine. Government restructuring
that burdens racial minorities’ interests within the political process violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Hunter Court
requires that the following two criteria be met to establish a racial
classification: (1) the law at issue concerns a racial issue, and (2) the law
restructures the political process in a way that burdens minority interests.31
Additionally, under Hunter, the political process doctrine requires that strict
scrutiny is the standard of review for any law that restructures the political
process in a racial manner or shifts a decision related to race from one level of
government to another.32
2.

Washington v. Seattle School District: Shifting Governmental
Authority

This case arose from attempts by the Seattle School District to remedy
racially isolated schools due to de facto segregation.33 School district efforts to
alleviate racial isolation through transfer programs and magnet schools were
unsuccessful.34 As a result, Seattle School District implemented a mandatory
busing program, called the Seattle Plan, for the purpose of creating racially
diverse schools.35 Under the Seattle Plan, both black and white students were
reassigned to promote diverse and equitable schools.36 Seattle residents who
opposed the school district’s mandatory desegregation programs proposed a
state law, Initiative 350, to prohibit mandatory busing policies to desegregate
Seattle schools.37 Although Initiative 350 passed by an overwhelming majority
of voters,38 the victory was short-lived. The Seattle School District filed a
lawsuit against the State of Washington challenging the constitutionality of

29. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 395 (Harlan, J., concurring).
30. Id.
31. Shirley, supra note 13, at 1420–21.
32. See David R. Friedman, Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action and the
Forgotten Oath, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 117, 117–18 (2013), available at http://www.stanford
lawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/articles/66_SLRO_117.pdf.
33. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 460 (1982).
34. Id. at 461.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 461–62.
38. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 463.
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Initiative 350 under the Equal Protection Clause, which guarantees racial
minorities the right to fully participate in the political process.39
According to the Court, the racial focus of Initiative 350 provoked the
application of the Hunter doctrine.40 Relying upon and expanding the
precedent established in Hunter, the Court held that Initiative 350 violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because, although
facially neutral, the initiative targeted a program designed to benefit racial
minorities.41 Second, Initiative 350 reallocated governmental power to enact
mandatory desegregation policies from local to state government.42 The
redistribution of power created an unjustifiable discriminatory burden on racial
minorities within the political process, making it more difficult to achieve
legislation in their interests, which violates the Equal Protection Clause.43 This
case is significant because it further developed the framework for the political
process doctrine by establishing that government restructuring places an unfair
discriminatory burden on minorities when it moves governmental decisionmaking to develop policies benefiting minorities from a lower to higher level
of government.
3.

Crawford v. Board of Education of L.A.

The Crawford44 case is the last case in the political process doctrine
trilogy. In this case, California voters passed Proposition I, an amendment to
the California Constitution that limited state court-ordered busing to
desegregate schools, except in instances where a federal court issued a busing
mandate to remedy a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.45 The central issue in Crawford was whether Proposition I, which
repealed legislation that benefited racial minorities, violated the Fourteenth
Amendment.46
In evaluating the constitutionality of Proposition I, the Court applied the
political process doctrine, finding no constitutional violation where a state,
through the political process, chooses to constrict its expansive busing program
to align with the federal desegregation standards.47 The Court reasoned that a

39. Id. at 464, 467.
40. Id. at 467. In applying the Hunter doctrine to evaluate an Equal Protection challenge, the
Court considered State actions that place special burdens on racial minorities to be “no more
permissible” than denying these members the right to vote. Id. at 470. In effect, a stricter analysis
is required “when the State allocates governmental power nonneutrally.” Id.
41. Id. at 484–85, 487.
42. Id. at 477.
43. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 483–84.
44. Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
45. Id. at 531–32.
46. Id. at 529.
47. Id. at 535.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2015]

SCHUETTE V. COALITION TO DEFEND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

393

state’s actions of simply repealing or revising desegregation or other laws
designed to deter discrimination, in and of itself has “never . . . been viewed as
embodying a presumptively invalid racial classification.”48 The Court found no
racial classification present in Proposition I because the law did not state that
persons are to be treated differently due to their race.49 The Court further
reasoned that Proposition I did not prohibit the enforcement of any federal law
or constitutional mandate.50 To the contrary, Proposition I merely aligned itself
with the desegregation criteria established by the Federal Constitution.51
B.

Equal Protection Jurisprudence in the Pre-Schuette Era

Schuette arose during a paradigm shift in constitutional jurisprudence from
the endorsement of race-conscious measures to race-neutrality in the pursuit of
educational equity. Although it is a well-established principle in equal
protection jurisprudence that limited uses of race is constitutionally permissible
to enable students to receive the educational benefits that flow from diversity,
preferential treatment of minorities has not gone unchallenged.52 Opponents of
affirmative action admissions policies have initiated numerous equal protection
challenges to the use of race in school admissions.53 It is within this backdrop
that the Court has continued to grapple with the endemic challenge of
promoting diverse and equitable learning environments while not
disadvantaging minorities and non-minorities. To this end, the Supreme Court
decisions in Bakke, Grutter, and Parents Involved have collectively served as a
benchmark for constitutional analysis of race-conscious school admissions
policies.54

48. Id. at 539.
49. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 537–38 (“Indeed, even if Proposition I had a racially
discriminatory effect, in view of the demographic mix of the District it is not clear which race or
races would be affected the most or in what way. In addition, this Court previously has held that
even when a neutral law has a disproportionately adverse effect on a racial minority, the
Fourteenth Amendment is violated only if a discriminatory purpose can be shown.”).
50. Id. at 535.
51. Id.
52. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
53. See id. (discussing whether the University of Michigan Law School’s use of racial
preferences in student admissions violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); see also Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
710–11 (2007) (deciding an Equal Protection challenge to the use of a racial tie breaker in a K-12
school assignment plan); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269–71 (1978)
(determining whether an affirmative action policy that resulted in the repeated rejection of a
medical student’s application for admission violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause and the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
54. It is important to note the relevancy of the Supreme Court’s most recent affirmative
action case, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). Since this Article focuses
on the K-12 schooling system, the Fisher case will be discussed in a subsequent article, which
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Regents of University of California v. Bakke

Many legal scholars characterize Regents of University of California v.
Bakke55 as a seminal case that changed the legal landscape in the context of
higher education in ways that will be felt for generations to come.56 The central
issue before the Court in Bakke was whether a university’s affirmative action
admissions policy violated the plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights.57
Bakke is significant in the equal protection jurisprudence milieu because it
placed higher education admissions and race at the “forefront of constitutional
law issues.”58 In this case, the plaintiff, a white male, applied twice for
admission to the University of California Medical School at Davis.59 He was
rejected both times. The controversy lies in the medical school’s admissions
policy. The medical school had a race-conscious admissions policy that
reserved sixteen places in each entering class for disadvantaged minority
students in an effort to integrate the medical profession and increase the
number of physicians willing to serve underserved populations.60 The
plaintiff’s admissions criteria (college GPA and MCAT test scores) exceeded
those of many of the minority students admitted during the two years his
applications were rejected. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit contending that the
medical school’s special admissions program excluded him on the basis of race
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.61
A divided Court ruled that the university’s special admissions program was
unconstitutional because it used explicit racial classifications to disregard
individual rights by excluding them solely for not being a minority.62 The
Court vehemently condemned this type of admissions policy for denying
potential non-minority applicants the opportunity to compete for one of the
available admissions seats.63 Additionally, the Court reasoned that, since the
focuses solely on the implications of the Schuette decision on higher education school
admissions. The Fisher case is significant because it presents for the first time the question of
whether the success of a race-neutral policy demands that a university abandon the use of race as
a factor in the admission of other students. See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2415. Additionally, the case
provides a first opportunity to challenge the Court’s willingness to continue its deference to
higher education administrators in their pursuit to achieve campus diversity through racial
preferences.
55. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265.
56. Steven M. Kirkelie, Comment, Higher Education Admissions and Diversity: The
Continuing Vitality of Bakke v. Regents of the University of California and an Attempt to
Reconcile Powell’s and Brennan’s Opinions, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 615, 616 (2002).
57. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 269–70.
58. Kirkelie, supra note 56, at 655.
59. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276.
60. Id. at 279.
61. Id. at 277–78.
62. Id. at 329.
63. Id. at 319–20.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2015]

SCHUETTE V. COALITION TO DEFEND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

395

plaintiff was unable to prove that the white applicant would not have been
admitted in the absence of the racial preferences utilized in the special
admissions program, he was entitled to be admitted.64 Lastly, the Court held
that the use of race as one of “several” admissions criteria was constitutionally
permissible under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.65
The admissions plans at issue utilized a point system that consider things such
as the applicant’s extra-curricular activities, GPA, MCAT score, and letters of
recommendation, as opposed to relying exclusively on race in admissions
decisions.66
2.

Grutter v. Bollinger

This case challenged the constitutionality of the University of Michigan’s
race-conscious school admissions policy that considered race in conjunction
with several other factors, such as LSAT score, GPA, and letters of
recommendation, when considering student applicants on an individual basis.67
The goal of the race-conscious admissions program was to enroll a critical
mass of diverse students for the purpose of obtaining the educational benefits
that flow from diversity, such as promoting cross-cultural understanding and
invalidating stereotypes.68 The admissions policy came under intense scrutiny
when a white student applied for admission to the University of Michigan Law
School and was denied admission despite having an LSAT score of 161 and a
3.8 undergraduate GPA.69 The student filed a lawsuit challenging the
university’s race-conscious admissions policy as a violation of her equal
protection rights by discriminating against her on the basis of race.70
The Supreme Court in Grutter held that the University of Michigan’s
narrowly tailored use of race in their law school admissions for the purpose of
furthering a compelling state interest in obtaining the educational benefits of
diversity was not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.71 The Court
emphasized that the admissions program looked at each individual applicant on
a case-by-case basis, and race or ethnicity was only considered as one of
several factors in the admissions decision.72 Therefore, the university’s raceconscious admissions program did not result in a quota.73 The University of

64. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320.
65. Id. at 314 (“Ethnic diversity, however, is only one element in a range of factors a
university properly may consider in attaining the goal of a heterogeneous student body.”).
66. Id. at 274.
67. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311–16 (2003).
68. Id. at 316, 330.
69. Id. at 316.
70. Id. at 316–17.
71. Id. at 343.
72. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336–37.
73. Id. at 335.
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Michigan’s law school admissions office considered both quantitative and
extracurricular qualifications, as well as each applicant’s potential for
contribution to educational diversity.74 This case helped shape affirmative
action jurisprudence in higher education by solidifying the legal principle that
admissions programs may not use a quota system; however, considerations of
race are permissible when each individual applicant is examined in a flexible,
non-mechanical way.
3.

Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle Public Schools

This case addressed the constitutionality of race-conscious school
assignment plans in K-12 schooling systems. Ironically, more than fifty years
ago, the Supreme Court justices in Brown, addressed whether public schools
could be “required” to integrate,75 whereas the legal issue in Parents Involved
was whether public schools are permitted to “voluntarily” integrate.76 In this
case, de facto segregation within Seattle Public Schools and Jefferson County
Schools created racially segregated schools due to segregated housing
patterns.77 In an effort to promote integration, both school districts adopted
race-conscious school admissions policies.78
The Seattle Public School system implemented a plan that used a series of
tiebreakers to determine which students were admitted to oversubscribed
schools.79 The first tiebreaker gave preference to students with a sibling
attending the school.80 The second and most controversial tiebreaker to allocate
spots in oversubscribed schools, classified students as white and non-white and
gave preference to a student’s race for the purpose of achieving a target racial
balance.81 Under the Jefferson County Schools plan, students are grouped into

74. Id. at 315–16. The Court stated:
The hallmark of that policy is its focus on academic ability coupled with a flexible
assessment of applicants’ talents, experiences, and potential “to contribute to the learning
of those around them.” The policy requires admissions officials to evaluate each applicant
based on all the information available in the file, including a personal statement, letters of
recommendation, and an essay describing the ways in which the applicant will contribute
to the life and diversity of the Law School . . . . The policy aspires to “achieve that
diversity which has the potential to enrich everyone’s education and thus make a law
school class stronger than the sum of its parts.” The policy does not restrict the types of
diversity contributions eligible for “substantial weight” in the admissions process, but
instead recognizes “many possible bases for diversity admissions.”
Id. (citations omitted).
75. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 488 (1954).
76. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 711 (2007).
77. Id. at 712.
78. Id. at 726–27.
79. Id. at 711.
80. Id. at 711–12.
81. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 712.
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attendance zones based on their home address, which dictated initial school
assignments.82 Next, parents and students were provided with various school
choice options among educational programs and schools (e.g., magnet schools)
within their designated attendance zone.83 The primary goal of the attendance
zones and school choice opportunities was to maintain a minimum of fifteen
percent and no more than fifty percent African American enrollment in each
school for the purpose of achieving racially diverse schools.84 The parents of
students attending the school districts filed suit alleging that the student
assignment plans that relied on race classifications to assign students to schools
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.85
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, holding that the school
assignment plans were unconstitutional because the school districts failed to
show that the use of racial classifications was necessary to achieve their stated
goal of racially diverse schools.86 In reaching its decision, the Court reasoned
that the school districts failed to present any empirical evidence that the level
of racial diversity necessary to achieve the asserted educational benefits of
diversity coincide with the racial demographics of the respective school
districts.87 The Court further emphasized that the type of racial balancing used
in the school assignment plans is not “transformed from ‘patently
unconstitutional’ to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it ‘racial
diversity.’”88 Although the Parents Involved Court acknowledged that diversity
is a compelling governmental interest, it denounced the type of racial
proportionality utilized in the school assignment plans at issue in the case.89
This case contributed to the affirmative action jurisprudence framework by
establishing that the legal principles established in Grutter are not applicable in
K-12 settings, because, unlike the university in Grutter, the school admissions
policy in Parents Involved applied a very constricted approach to diversity
(white, non-white classification) and failed to evaluate students on an
individual basis. Lastly, the Parents Involved Court articulated the importance

82. Id. at 716.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 714.
86. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 735.
87. Id. at 727 (“The district did not attempt to defend the proposition that anything outside
its range posed the ‘specter of exceptionality.’ Nor did it demonstrate in any way how the
educational and social benefits of racial diversity or avoidance of racial isolation are more likely
to be achieved at a school that is 50 percent white and 50 percent Asian-American, which would
qualify as diverse under Seattle’s plan, than at a school that is 30 percent Asian-American, 25
percent African-American, 25 percent Latino, and 20 percent white, which under Seattle’s
definition would be racially concentrated.”).
88. Id. at 732.
89. Id. at 722, 732.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

398

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:385

of school districts demonstrating that they made a good faith effort to consider
race-neutral alternatives before using explicit racial classifications.90 Both
Seattle Public Schools and Jefferson County Public Schools failed to meet that
burden.
II. EMPOWERING THE MAJORITY BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY: SCHUETTE V.
COALITION TO DEFEND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
At first glance, Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action,
Integration and Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equality by Any Means
Necessary (BAMN)91 appears to be a case that challenges existing Supreme
Court precedent regarding the constitutionality of race-conscious admissions
policies. However, although the outcome of Schuette directly impacts the use
of race in higher education school admissions, the issue is framed differently.92
This case examined whether an amendment to a state constitution approved by
the majority of voters can be invalidated under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.93
Since the historic Grutter decision in 2003, citizens of the state of
Michigan and beyond have engaged in discourse surrounding the use of raceconscious admissions policies in higher education. Michigan voters responded
to the existing equal protection jurisprudence permitting limited use of race in
school admissions by spearheading a movement to amend the state constitution
to rescind affirmative action admissions policies through a ballot initiative,
Proposal 2.94 Under Proposal 2, it is unconstitutional for elected members of a
university’s governing board to establish race-conscious admissions programs
in Michigan.95 Successful anti-affirmative action grass roots efforts propelled
Proposal 2 to Michigan’s 2006 election ballot for consideration.96 Proposal 2
passed by a margin of fifty-eight percent to forty-two percent and was enacted
as article I, section 26 of the Michigan Constitution.97 Section 26 of the
constitution reads in part as follows:

90. Id. at 735.
91. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight
for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
92. See id. at 1630.The Court emphasized, however, that the guiding principle regarding the
constitutionality of considerations of race in higher education admissions remained unchanged.
See id.
93. Id. at 1629–30.
94. Christopher E. D’Alessio, Note, A Bridge Too Far: The Limits of the Political Process
Doctrine in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL’Y SIDEBAR 103, 103 (2013), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1108&context=djclpp_sidebar.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 105.
97. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1629.
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(1) The University of Michigan, Michigan State University, Wayne State
University, and any other public or college university, community college or
school district shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to,
any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national
origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public
contracting.
(2) The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment
to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or
national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or
public contracting.
(3) For the purposes of this section “state” includes, but is not necessarily
limited to, the state itself, any city, county, any public college, university, or
community college, school district, or other political subdivision or
governmental instrumentality of or within the State of Michigan not included
98
in subsection 1.

Opponents of the passage of Proposal 2 responded with two legal challenges to
the constitutionality of article I, section 26 of the Michigan Constitution.99
Among the plaintiffs asserting the legal challenge were the Coalition to Defend
Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equality
By Any Means Necessary (BAMN); faculty; and current and prospective
students to Michigan public universities.100 The defendants included the
governor, Board of Trustees of Michigan State University, Board of Governors
of Wayne State University, and the Board of Regents of the University of
Michigan.101 The district court consolidated the cases and granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendants, thus upholding Proposal 2.102
The plaintiffs appealed the district court’s decision to the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals after the district court denied a motion to reconsider
summary judgment.103 The Sixth Circuit reversed the grant of summary
judgment, holding that Proposal 2 violated the legal principles set forth in
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1,104 which, according to the Sixth
98. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26.
99. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1629.
100. Id. at 1629–30.
101. Id. at 1630.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equal.
by Any Means Necessary (BAMN) v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 652 F.3d 607, 610 (6th Cir.
2012), rev’d sub nom. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant
Rights & Fight to Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014). In
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, the Court held an initiative prohibiting school boards
from requiring any student to attend a school other than the school geographically nearest the
student’s residence violated the Equal Protection Clause. 458 U.S. 457, 462, 487 (1982). The
initiative was passed in response to a mandatory busing program that was passed by the school
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Circuit’s majority opinion, “mirrors the [case] before us.”105 Thus, in
determining under what circumstances, if any, voters may choose to prohibit
certain preferences, including race-based preferences in governmental decision
making, the Court relied heavily on the precedent established in Washington v.
Seattle School Dist No. 1106 and Hunter v. Erickson107 to resolve the case.108
The central issue in Schuette was whether Michigan voters may use the
political process (i.e. referendum) to prohibit race-conscious measures in
governmental decisions, particularly with respect to school admissions.109 In
this case, Michigan voters used the initiative system to circumvent the
Supreme Court precedent in Grutter, Bakke, and Parents Involved, which
permits race-conscious admissions policies.110 As previously discussed, in
2003, the Court assessed the constitutionality of the University of Michigan’s

board. Id. at 461–62. The Court held the initiative unconstitutional because it shifted educational
decision-making to the state. Id. at 474. Furthermore, the state used the racial nature of the issue
to define the state’s decision-making structure. Id. The Court concluded that the shift in decisionmaking authority imposed substantial and unique burdens on racial minorities. Id.
105. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1630.
106. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. at 487.
107. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
108. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1631–33. It is helpful to highlight the relevant case, Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), that preceded the Seattle case and helped establish the legal
framework for the political process doctrine at the center of the Schuette case. In Mulkey,
California voters amended the state constitution to protect an owner’s choice to decline to rent or
sell residential property from any type of prohibition or interference by the state legislature.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. at 371. In this case, two couples experienced discriminatory housing practices.
Id. at 372. One couple was evicted from their apartment and another denied the opportunity to
rent an apartment, both were on account of race. Id. Additionally, in both cases the victims were
barred from utilizing the protection of California’s statutes that prohibit discrimination due to the
amendment to the state constitution, granting owners the freedom to decline to rent or sell
residential property on any basis, including race. Id. The plaintiffs, the two couples discriminated
against, challenged the constitutionality of the amendment. Id. at 373. The Court held that the
amendment was unconstitutional because the “immediate design and intent” of the law was to
solidify a constitutional right to discriminate. Id. at 374. The dissent incorrectly reasoned that the
amendment was constitutional because the voter’s actions were not intended to encourage
discrimination, but rather ensuring that the State of California would remain a neutral party in the
renting and selling of private property. Id. at 388 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
109. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1629.
110. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 722 (2007)
(“The second government interest we have recognized as compelling for purposes of strict
scrutiny is the interest in diversity in higher education.”); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334
(2003) (“Universities can, however, consider race or ethnicity more flexibly as a ‘plus’ factor in
the context of individualized consideration of each and every applicant.”); Regents of Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (“[T]he State has a substantial interest that legitimately
may be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the competitive consideration
of race and ethnic origin.”).
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school admissions policies and found no constitutional violation in their
limited use of race-conscious measures.111
III. POLITICAL PROCESS DOCTRINE: A TOOL FOR MORAL EXCLUSION IN K–12
SCHOOLS
The Schuette decision and education reform efforts that discount the
significance of race to promote equal educational opportunity represent the
moral exclusion of one of the most vulnerable sectors of our population,
minority children, under the guise of neutrality. Moral exclusion is “a
psychosocial orientation toward certain individuals or groups for whom justice
principles or considerations of fairness and allocation of resources are not
applicable.”112 Thus, moral exclusion occurs when groups or individuals create
moral boundaries which are used to exclude others from equitable treatment
and considerations of fairness.113 Excluded individuals are perceived as
nonexistent, expendable, and not worthy of being treated equal.114 Moral
exclusion is also identified as a continuous construct that varies in degree
depending on the severity of the situation.115 Assessing the concept of moral
exclusion from the perspective of a continuum gives an insightful perspective
into the extreme separation between those that are within the moral community
and those that are excluded.
There are numerous psychological factors that contribute to the moral
exclusion of individuals within a society, such as altruism, stigma,
discrimination, and prejudice.116 According to Moral Exclusion Theory,
individuals who are a part of the dominant group perceive themselves and their
group as more honest, fair, moral, and virtuous than those in the excluded
group.117 The dominant group socially categorizes others based on things such
as race, gender, and values, and excludes them from equal treatment on the
basis of those differences.118 As a result, this theory contends that our natural
tendency to socially categorize individuals serves as a breeding ground for
moral exclusion. Extreme examples of moral exclusion include, but are not
limited to, events such as the institution of slavery, the Holocaust, and the
internment of Japanese Americans during World War II. Moral Exclusion
Theory has been used as a conceptual framework to view various group
dynamics in the field of sociology. However, in this Article, Moral Exclusion

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
Leets, supra note 8.
Opotow, supra note 9.
Id.
Leets, supra note 8, at 1861.
Opotow, supra note 9, at 2.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
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Theory will be utilized as a theoretical lens to examine barriers to equal
educational opportunity in the context of the recent Supreme Court decision in
Schuette, which upheld the constitutionality of article I, section 26 of the
Michigan Constitution, an anti-affirmative action ballot initiative.119
Although the Schuette decision examined the use of race-conscious
admissions policies in higher education, article I, section 26 explicitly states its
applicability to K-12 schools as well:
The University of Michigan, Michigan State University, Wayne State
University, and any other public college or university, community college, or
school district shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to,
any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national
origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public
120
contracting.

Therefore, although this Article focuses on K-12 school systems, the
debilitating effects of this law on equal educational opportunity will permeate
both the K-12 and higher education milieus.
A.

Article I, Section 26 Morally Excludes Minority Children by Undermining
Public School’s Ability to Create Diverse and Equitable Schools.

The Schuette decision’s endorsement of article I, section 26 of the
Michigan Constitution morally excludes minority students by undermining
school leaders’ ability to create and maintain diverse and equitable schools.
How can school leaders integrate racially segregated schools without raceconscious admissions policies? Article I, section 26 comes at a tumultuous
time in U.S. history where K-12 schools are rapidly re-segregating to the preBrown era as school leaders, policymakers, and stakeholders in education
struggle to dismantle dual education systems that unfairly disadvantage
minorities and children living in poverty. The endemic challenge of remedying
de jure and de facto segregation in K-12 public schools is not a new
phenomenon, but well-established in social science literature.121 According to

119. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight
for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1630, 1638 (2014).
120. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26.
121. Laura R. McNeal, The Re-Segregation of Public Education Now and After the End of
Brown v. Board of Education, 41 EDUC. URB. SOC’Y 562, 564 (2009) (“The harsh reality is that
more than 250 school districts still operate dual school systems, which are not only separate but
inherently unequal as well. The rapid growth of segregated minority schools is most evident in
urban settings, which are characterized by high-poverty, high-minority student populations. For
example, large urban school districts such as Atlanta Public Schools and Chicago Public Schools
have student populations that consist of 92% students of color and 8% White . . . .”); Gary Orfield
& David Thronson, Dismantling Desegregation: Uncertain Gains, Unexpected Costs, 42 EMORY
L.J. 759, 761 (1993) (“The ideas, for example, that political conflict will diminish and that nonjudicial mechanisms can assure equity in the resegregated minority schools are not supported
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educational researchers Gary Orfield and Chungmei Lee, characteristics of
racially segregated schools are inadequate facilities, poor academic
achievement outcomes, low graduation rates, and poor teacher quality.122 The
Court’s deliberate indifference to the harmful effects of racially segregated
schools results in the moral exclusion of minority children because they are
treated as expendable and not worthy of being treated equally. The Court’s
decision in Schuette to allow voters to restructure government decision-making
not only limits the ability of minorities to advocate for their interests, but also
undermines the spirit and purpose of Grutter, which is to ensure that all
students receive the educational benefits that flow from diversity.
Desegregating schools can only be achieved with laws and policies that
promote diverse and equitable learning environments. Instead of promoting
educational equity, the Schuette decision lays the foundation for laws like
article I, section 26, which morally exclude minority students from receiving
equal educational opportunity through the perpetuation of racially segregated
schools. Article I, section 26 is a tool for moral exclusion because it is
designed to create and maintain a dual education system between the haves and
have-nots by removing the most effective remedy for de facto segregation in
K-12 schools: race-conscious admissions policies.123
Article I, section 26 also perpetuates one of the key indices of Moral
Exclusion Theory, where the dominant group excludes a minority group from
equal treatment and creates moral boundaries that distinguish who is entitled to
resources and considerations of fairness. Specifically, article I, section 26
morally excludes minority students by manipulating the political process to
create moral boundaries between the voters with majority voting power and
those with minority voting power. Article I, section 26 ensures that individuals
within the moral boundaries have their educational interests represented,

empirically in several districts.”); GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, HISTORIC REVERSALS,
ACCELERATING RESEGREGATION, AND THE NEED FOR NEW INTEGRATION STRATEGIES 3 (2007)
(“American schools, resegregating gradually for almost two decades, are now experiencing
accelerating isolation and this will doubtless be intensified by the recent decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court.”).
122. ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI, supra note 121, at 5 (“On average, segregated minority schools
are inferior in terms of the quality of their teachers, the character of the curriculum, the level of
competition, average test scores, and graduation rates.”).
123. It is important to note that advocates of race-neutral approaches to integrated racially
segregated schools posit that the Socio-Economic Integration model will achieve the same results
as race-conscious approaches. The Socio-Economic model uses students’ household income as a
proxy for race. Although this integration strategy has shown positive results, it only works in
limited settings. For example, using students’ socioeconomic status for school assignments is
ineffective in large urban school districts with high concentrations of poverty among white and
black students because assigning students based on income will not guarantee racial diversity.
Thus, based on the integration strategies that are available race-conscious measures are the most
effective remedy to eradicating racially isolated schools. See McNeal, supra note 121, at 571.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

404

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:385

whereas those outside of the moral community are denied equal protection of
the laws due to the majority’s manipulation of the political process in a manner
that disadvantages racial minorities.124
The Schuette Court’s deliberate indifference to the substandard education
minority children receive in racially isolated schools, through the endorsement
of democratically approved legislation that erects barriers to educational
equity, demonstrates the Court’s continued retreat from the promise of
Brown.125 Moreover, for the Court to allow the political process doctrine to be
used in a manner that thwarts prior judicial efforts to promote educational
equity and that constructs insurmountable hurdles for minorities to advocate
for their education interests is also an indication of moral exclusion. The
Schuette decision is also disconcerting because it is contrary to prior precedent.
Hunter and Seattle substantiated a bedrock principle that is at the core of equal
protection jurisprudence: “The majority may not suppress the minority’s right
to participate on equal terms in the political process.”126 Despite this guiding
doctrinal principle, the Schuette Court turned a blind eye to the harmful effects
of article I, section 26 on minorities’ ability to represent their interests in the
political process and allowed voters to circumvent school integration efforts.
The Schuette Court’s application of the Hunter criteria to evaluate the
constitutionality of section 26 under the political process doctrine was
erroneous and perpetuates the moral exclusion of minority students. As
previously stated, the Hunter Court requires that the following two criteria be
met to establish a racial classification in violation of the political process
doctrine: (1) the law at issue concerns a racial issue, and (2) the law
restructures the political process in a way that burdens minority interests.
Additionally, under Hunter the political process doctrine requires that strict
scrutiny be used as the standard of review for any law that restructures the
political process in a racial manner or shifts a decision related to race from one
level of government to another.
A strict application of the Hunter principles reveals the unconstitutionality
of article I, section 26 and the Schuette Court’s gross error in application. First,
section 26 focuses on race by prohibiting Michigan’s public schools from
implementing race-conscious admissions policies.127 Second, section 26

124. See Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1653 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“But instead, the majority of
Michigan voters changed the rules in the middle of the game, reconfiguring the existing political
process in Michigan in a manner that burdened racial minorities.”).
125. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“We conclude that in the field of
public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational facilities
are inherently unequal.”).
126. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1659 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 1629 (majority opinion).
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restructures the political process in a manner that unfairly burdens minorities128
by creating a higher standard for enacting race-conscious admissions plans for
public schools.129 Instead of applying the correct application of the political
process doctrine, the Court attempted to reinterpret Hunter and Seattle by
refusing to acknowledge the “intentional and invidious” racial injury caused by
section 26 to minority voters in Michigan.130 In addition, the Court’s complete
disregard for the precedent established in Hunter and intentional recharacterization of the principles set forth in Seattle demonstrate the Court’s
commitment to color-blind rhetoric that allows the majority to restructure the
political process to place minorities outside the moral boundaries with little
recourse.
Article I, section 26 further exacerbates the problem by removing the
integration tool that has achieved the greatest degree of success in creating
racially diverse learning environments, race-conscious policies. Other raceneutral alternatives such as socioeconomic school assignment plans only work
in limited education contexts where the majority of minority students are living
in poverty.131 For example, utilizing socioeconomic status to assign students in
a school district with a high-poverty student population among both white and
black students is an ineffective integration tool because assigning students
based on their household income will not create racial diversity. The
implications for K-12 schools are alarming in the aftermath of the Schuette
decision. How can K-12 schools prepare students for the increasingly global
society in which we live in racially isolated learning environments?
B.

Article I, Section 26 Promotes the Moral Exclusion of Minority Children
by Codifying Racial Discrimination into Law.

Article I, section 26 of the Michigan Constitution promotes the resegregation of Michigan’s public schools by codifying racial discrimination
into law. Although the majority attempts to discount the significance of the
Schuette decision by stating that the case is not about the constitutionality of

128. Section 26 places a unique burden on minorities by requiring voters to amend the
Constitution to permit the use of race in school admissions for the purposes of creating diverse
and equitable schools. Prior to section 26, voters were allowed to lobby the university’s
governing board. Id. at 1660 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). However, after the passage of section 26
supporters of race-conscious admissions must endure the arduous task of obtaining either a twothirds majority vote from both Houses of the Michigan state legislature or meet the requirements
for a ballot initiative to support their interests, which requires ten percent of the total number of
votes cast in the previous gubernational election. See MICH. CONST. art. XII, §§ 1–2 (delineating
the Michigan requirements for Constitutional amendment).
129. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1660 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 1664.
131. McNeal, supra note 121, at 571.
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race-conscious admissions,132 the negative impact on school desegregation
efforts will be felt for years. The law’s prohibition of race-conscious policies to
ensure that students receive the educational benefits that flow from diversity
articulated in Grutter undermines prior judicial efforts to integrate K-12
schools. Additionally, the Schuette decision sends a symbolic and substantive
message to opponents of affirmative action that the political process may be
used to restructure governmental decision-making to create state laws that
promote, as opposed to hinder, racial discrimination. This is further evidenced
by the Court’s repudiation of the Seattle Court’s recognition of the importance
of balancing constitutional protections and state sovereignty to prevent the
reallocation of power in a manner that unfairly burdens minority interests
within the political process.133 This practice morally excludes minorities by
allowing the political process to become a tool of manipulation to advance the
interests of the majority at the expense of the minority. The codification of
racial discrimination into law under the guise of preserving democracy is a
facade to obscure the systemic moral exclusion of minorities. As Justice
Sotomayor so eloquently stated in her dissent:
But what the majority could not do, consistent with the Constitution, is change
the ground rules of the political process in a manner that makes it more
difficult for racial minorities alone to achieve their goals. In doing so, the
majority effectively rigs the contest to guarantee a particular outcome. That is
the very wrong the political-process doctrine seeks to remedy. The doctrine
“hews to the unremarkable notion that when two competitors are running a
race, one may not require the other to run twice as far or to scale obstacles not
134
present in the first runner’s course.”

Due to the Court’s deliberate indifference to anti-affirmative action
constituents’ manipulation of the political process doctrine, anti-discrimination
laws such as article I, section 26 achieve their intended purpose, which is to
promote a more narrow view of constitutional protections that lay the
groundwork for the rejection of “unnecessary” race-conscious laws.135

132. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1630 (“[This case] is not about the constitutionality, or the merits,
of race-conscious admissions policies in higher education. . . . The question here concerns . . .
whether, and in what manner, voters in the States may choose to prohibit the consideration of
racial preferences in governmental decisions, in particular with respect to school admissions.”).
133. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 487 (1982) (“[W]e do not
undervalue the magnitude of the State’s interest in its system of education. Washington could
have reserved to state officials the right to make all decision in the areas of education and student
assignment. It has chosen, however, to use a more elaborate system; having done so, the State is
obligated to operate the system within the confines of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
134. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1670 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
135. Powell, supra note 2, at 452.
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CONCLUSION
The Schuette decision is just another step toward the demise of raceconscious school admissions policies designed to create diverse and equitable
schools. Since the historic Brown v. Board of Education decision, the Court
has slowly retreated from the promise of Brown by discounting the
significance of race in equal educational opportunity. The paradigm shift in the
Court, from a substantive role in educational equity to mere bystanders, is
evident by the majority’s rhetoric in education-related cases. In Parents
Involved, Chief Justice Roberts stated, “The way to stop discrimination on the
basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”136 Seven years later
Justice Sotomayor, who was not on the court in 2007 when Parents Involved
was decided, said in her dissent in Schuette, “The way to stop discrimination
on the basis of race is to speak openly and candidly on the subject of race, and
to apply the Constitution with eyes open to the unfortunate effects of centuries
of racial discrimination.”137 The Justices’ divergent perceptions regarding the
state of race relations in the country and what impact, if any, it has on equitable
outcomes for minority students are very disconcerting. As the movement to
abolish race-conscious preferences continues, it is imperative that stakeholders
in education debunk false notions of a post-racial society and demonstrate the
harmful effects of racially isolated learning environments for minorities and
society at-large. This can be accomplished through creating a stronger
evidentiary basis to demonstrate the correlation between diverse learning
environments and student achievement outcomes to support equal protection
challenges to racially segregated schools. Additionally, proponents of raceconscious policies must make a concerted effort to garner greater support
within their individual communities to defeat the passage of state ballot
initiatives that are designed to undermine school integration efforts such as
article I, section 26.
In closing, the Supreme Court’s decision in Schuette is a dangerous step in
the wrong direction because, as Justice Sotomayor said in her dissenting
opinion, “[W]ithout checks, democratically approved legislation can oppress
minority groups.”138 We must create procedural safeguards to protect minority
interests that are at the core of our democratic ideals from the tyranny of the
majority. The shortfalls of our education system are disconcerting because
democracy and education are inextricably linked. As a nation with a
foundation built on democracy, how can we continue to uphold our democratic
ideals of freedom, equality, and justice for all with an education system that
privileges some while marginalizing others? This notion is best captured in the

136. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007).
137. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1676 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 1651.
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following quote by John Kenneth Galbraith, “[E]ducation makes democracy
possible, and, along with economic development, it makes it necessary, even
inevitable.”139

139. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GOOD SOCIETY: THE HUMANE AGENDA 72 (1996).

